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Abstract—Vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) are one of
the most important components in an Intelligent Transportation
System (ITS), which aims to provide information communica-
tion between vehicles. A safety-critical vehicular communication
requires security, privacy, auditability and efficiency. To satisfy
these requirements simultaneously, several conditional privacy-
preserving authentication schemes are proposed by employing
ring signature. However, these methods have been paid too
little attention to the issues like how to choose the valid ring
members or how to set up a ring. In this paper, we introduce an
efficient conditional privacy-preserving scheme which provides
an appropriate approach establishing the list of ring members.
Moreover, our proposed scheme also supports batch verification
to significantly reduce the computational cost. According to the
analysis of security, our scheme is sufficiently resistant against
several common attacks in VANETs. The performance results
show that the proposed scheme is efficient and practical with
both low computation and communication cost.
Index Terms—VANETs, ITS, ring signature, conditional pri-
vacy, batch verification
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) as a special case
of Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs) optimized for ve-
hicular environments play an important role in Intelligent
Transportation Systems (ITS). In a typical scenario of ITS,
each vehicle broadcast traffic-related information, such as its
speed, position, the road condition, etc. via VANETs. After
receiving these broadcast messages, vehicles analyze and ex-
tract meaningful information to drivers, or take corresponding
control actions in some emergencies. In this way, road safety
and efficiency will be greatly enhanced, and this is essential
for automated vehicles. However, due to the high demand for
road safety features, to design a practical protocol for VANETs
is highly nontrivial. Most of the proposed schemes are built
based on the IEEE 802.11p standard.
In IEEE 802.11p, the participants in the road are classified
into two categories, i.e., On-Board Units (OBUs) and Road-
Side Units (RSUs). Each vehicle is equipped with an OBU for
broadcasting messages and handling the received messages.
The RSUs are usually fixed along roads as the base stations
to provide Internet access and extra road information for
vehicles. Therefore, VANETs provide two different types of
communication, namely, vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) and
vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) as shown in Fig. 1. Because the
broadcast messages are necessary in important applications,
like collision avoidance, traffic optimization, we suppose that
these messages have no necessary relevance to vehicles’
identities. As a result, drivers can be reminded by receiving the
broadcast messages from other vehicles or RSUs in VANETs.
In practice, a trusted party, the Transportation Regulation
Center (TRC), is needed to administrate the whole network.
RSUs can connect with TRC for obtaining extra information.
Fig. 1. VANETs overview
However, because of the open environment of VANETs,
an attacker could send a forged message to confuse other
drivers, which may further cause potential traffic hazards. To
achieve road safety, it is essential to authenticate the validity
of a message. The first serious discussions of road safety
emerged in 2002 and utilized digital signatures [1]. After
that, a considerable amount of work has been done based on
different digital signature schemes [2].
When applying digital signature schemes in VANETs, upon
each message will attach some extra information including
signature, signer’s certificate and so on. This extra information
may be used to link to the driver’s true identity, and this
may lead to privacy disclosure. Therefore, how to keep the
anonymity of senders while the message can be authenticated
by verifiers becomes another essential issue in VANETs.
One common approach is to replace the true identity with
a random-like string called pseudonyms. On the other hand,
in some specific scenarios such as a traffic accident, there
should be a possibility to reveal the true identity of senders
according to the attached information. To this end, a func-
tion of auditability should be provided. Thus, authentication,
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privacy, and auditability are three basic requirements when
designing a feasible scheme for communication in VANETs.
Besides, due to the limited computation and storage capability
of both OBUs and RSUs, efficiency should also be considered
in VANETs.
In this paper, we propose a hybrid scheme, which employs
ring signatures in VANETs with batch verification mode, and
hereby efficiently enables auditability for ring members. More
precisely, our contributions are summarized in the following:
• We propose a novel scheme for VANETs based on
identity-based ring signature, where the procedure of cre-
ating a ring is restricted to make ring members auditable.
• We provide a batch mode for message verification. As
indicated by performance, this makes our scheme highly
efficient. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
attempt that applies ring batch verification in VANETs.
• We give security analysis of the proposed scheme and
implement our scheme in the Raspberry Pi 3b+ platform.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, some related work is presented to balance authen-
tication and privacy in VANETs. Section III introduces the
system model and some preliminary cryptographic primitives.
In Section IV, a description of our schemes is given in detail.
After that, security analysis and performance analysis are
provided in Section V and Section VI respectively. Finally,
Section VII concludes this paper and proposes some potential
future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Numerous studies have attempted to employ pseudonym
schemes to assure authentication and privacy simultaneously.
specifically, the cryptography tools utilized include public key
infrastructure (PKI), identity-based cryptography (IBC), group
signature, ring signature and so on (for recent surveys, see [2],
[3]).
At the early stages of the study, PKI is most widely used in
VANETs. In these schemes based on PKI, as a trusted party,
Certificate Authority (CA) is needed. Each vehicle broadcasts
messages attached to the corresponding signatures and public-
key certificates. Taking the SeVeCom project [4] as an exam-
ple, the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA)
is utilized to assure efficiency. A pseudonym consists of
two parts: a short-term key and its corresponding certificate.
Since the use of certificates increases the communication
overhead, it was alternatively suggested to employ IBC instead
of certificates [1], [5].
Similarly, IBC-based schemes also adopt a set of short-
term public keys to form vehicles’ pseudonyms, while the
procedure of pseudonym issuance differs. Note that in IBC-
based schemes, a new entity—private key generator (PKG)—
is introduced without the existence of CA. Thus, certificates
are not attached when broadcasting messages in these schemes,
and the communication overhead is thereby decreased.
There exists a major problem in both PKI-based and IBC-
based pseudonym schemes: pseudonym change since it is not
sufficient to use a single pseudonym to preserve vehicles’ pri-
vacy. In these two kinds of schemes, using a single pseudonym
is not sufficient to preserve the vehicle’s privacy. As a simple
setting, each vehicle is equipped with a set of public keys,
each of which can be viewed as an unlinkable pseudonym, and
expires after a fixed amount of time. Wiedersheim et al. [6]
pointed out that simple pseudonym change is not enough to
preserve privacy. There have been attempts on the strategy of
pseudonym change, e.g., mix-zone-based [7] and mix-context-
based [8]. However, it is still mysterious to formalize the
relationship between pseudonym change strategies and privacy
level [2], [9].
The issue of pseudonym change can be eliminated in those
schemes based on group signature and ring signature [2], [10],
since messages are signed under the identity of a certain group
rather than a single vehicle’s pseudonym. Group signature-
based schemes allow a vehicle to sign a message anonymously
on behalf of the group. In group signatures, a special entity
called group manager can reveal any signer’s real identity
from the corresponding signature. Till now, there has been
little agreement on the choice of group manager [2]. As the
administrator of the group, the group manager has the privilege
to add or delete a group member. It is then straightforward to
achieve auditability of group members by the group manager.
It was suggested that RSUs serve as group managers [11],
[12]. However, RSUs are vulnerable to some extent, and this
setting is not sufficient to guarantee group members’ privacy
In comparison, ring signature-based schemes [13]–[15] fur-
ther removes group managers by involving a set of different
vehicles’ public keys as the “group” (ring). In existing ring
signature-based schemes, e.g., [13], each vehicle can collect
other vehicles’ public keys on roads and thereby checks the
validity of ring members before verification. Unfortunately,
this would lead to verification failure when a malicious vehicle
broadcasts an invalid public key. As depicted in Fig. 2,
due to the existence of a malicious vehicle in the ring, the
generated signature by the whole ring would be rejected by
other vehicles. In existing such schemes, privacy is the main
focus while the lack of auditiability of ring members is still a
problem [13], [16].
Fig. 2. A negative case in ring signature-based schemes
Notably, Petit et al. [2] emphasize that these categories are
not hard-edged so that several recent works combine different
techniques from the previous categories. Survey [3] listed these
hybrid schemes and discussed their security and efficiency in
performance. These results pointed out that recently proposed
schemes attempt to apply the batch verification of signatures
into the verification procedure, which can greatly reduce the
computation cost comparing with single verification.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly introduce the system model, and
several cryptographic primitives, including bilinear pairings,
identity-based encryption, and identity-based ring signature.
A. System model
Generally, our VANETs model consists of four main enti-
ties: the Transportation Regulation Center (TRC), Law En-
forcement Authorities (LEA), RSUs and vehicles equipped
with OBUs. The detailed description of these entities is listed
as follows.
• TRC: The TRC is a fully trusted party in the VANETs
system with sufficient computation and storage capa-
bilities. TRC takes charge of system initialization and
registration of other entities like RSUs and vehicles. We
assume that TRC can establish a secure channel with each
RSU. Besides, TRC is also responsible for identity reveal
and OBU revocation. Typically, to record the identities of
those invalid vehicles, TRC manages a revocation list.
• LEA: LEA is the agency for ensuring the accountability
of vehicles. In other words, when a vehicle broadcasts
fake messages anonymously on purpose, the LEA can
reveal the identity of the vehicle with the help of TRC.
• RSUs: An RSU usually plays an auxiliary role between
TRC and vehicles. Namely, RSUs can communicate with
TRC through wired or wireless networks and broadcast
messages to vehicles in a restricted region. In our system,
RSUs can obtain a revocation list from TRC periodically
and delivery ring-member lists to vehicles.
• Vehicles: Each vehicle in this system is equipped with a
communication device called OBU. We assume that each
OBU contains hardware security modules (HSM), and
the required cryptographic operations are executed inside
HSMs.
B. Bilinear pairings
Bilinear pairings have been widely used to design various
cryptographic schemes over the last two decades [17]–[19].
Let G1, G2, GT be three cyclic groups of the same prime
order q. Assume that the discrete logarithm problem in G1,
G2 and GT is hard. Let eˆ : G1 × G2 → GT be a bilinear
pairing with the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: ∀P ∈ G1, ∀Q ∈ G2 and ∀a, b ∈ Z∗q ,
e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab;
2. Non-degenerate: ∃P ∈ G1, ∃Q ∈ G2 such that e(P,Q) 6=
1;
3. Computability: ∀g1 ∈ G1,∀g2 ∈ G2, there is an efficient
algorithm to compute eˆ(g1, g2).
There are two hard-problem assumptions in bilinear pair-
ings, i.e., Computational Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (CBDH)
Problem and Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH)
Problem, as described in the following.
• CBDH: Given P ∈ G1, aQ,bQ,cQ ∈ (G2)3, where
a, b, c ∈R (Z∗q)3, it is difficult to calculate eˆ(P,Q)abc.
• DBDH: Given P ∈ G1, aQ,bQ,cQ ∈ (G2)3, h ∈ GT ,
where a,b,c ∈R (Z∗q)3, it is difficult to determine whether
or not h = eˆ(P,Q)abc mod q.
C. Identity-based cryptography
Bilinear pairings are used to construct identity-based en-
cryption and signature schemes. Compared to traditional PKI,
identity-based cryptography avoids CA since each user’s pub-
lic key can be automatically derived from the corresponding
identity(e.g., user’s phone number, email address) In general,
a common Identity-based cryptosystem contains two basic
algorithms.
1. Setup(1κ) → pp: Taken the input of security parameter
κ, the algorithm Setup(1κ) first chooses a master secret
key s ∈R Z∗q , and then outputs the public parame-
ter pp = {G1,G2,GT , P,Q, PK1, PK2, q, eˆ, H1, H2},
where G1,G2,GT , q, eˆ are described in Section III-B. P
is the generator of G1, Q is the generator of G2, and
PK1 = s · P , PK2 = s · Q. H1, H2 and H are three
cryptographic hash function where H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1,
H2 : {0, 1}∗ → G2, H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q .
2. KeyGen(IDi)→ {pki, ski}: When user i wants to obtain
his/her public key and private key from the system,
he/she first sends the specific identity IDi to system. After
authentication is accepted, the system runs KeyGen(IDi)
to derive the user’s public key pki and private key ski,
where pki = H1(IDi) and ski = s · pki.
The first practical identity-based encryption scheme [17]
was proposed in 2001 by Boneh and Franklin. In the rest of
this paper, we use Encpki(·) and Decski(·) to denote the variant
of Identity-based encryption and decryption algorithms in [17]
respectively.
Furthermore, an identity-based ring signature is also used
in our scheme, which requires verifiers to verify messages
through a specific set of signers. Being different from the
traditional signature, an identity-based ring signature scheme
requires verifier to verify messages through a specific set of
signers.
We adopt the identity-based ring signature in [18] in our
proposed scheme. There are two essential algorithms, i.e.,
signature algorithm Signski(m,L) → σ and verification al-
gorithm VerifyL(σ,m) → 0/1, where m and L denote the
message and the ring-member list, respectively.
IV. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we illustrate our scheme in detail. First, we
use an abstract pseudonym life-cycle [2] as shown in Fig. 3 to
roughly describe how our scheme works. We divide the whole
life-cycle into six phases: initialization, key generation, ring
list distribution, sign, verification and trace.
After the initialization of TRC, each vehicle or RSU is
assumed to obtain a pair of the public key and private key
Fig. 3. Our proposed scheme
from TRC. The public key in this system is also regarded
as the corresponding pseudonym. RSU also obtains a set of
vehicles’ pseudonyms from TRC in the progress of the key
generation.
Once a vehicle enters into a certain region, it obtains a fresh
pseudonym list from the local RSU by sending its pseudonym.
Then the vehicle can choose pseudonyms from the list to sign
messages by identity-based ring signature. Other vehicles can
verify the signature locally by using the public parameters pre-
loaded in OBUs. Moreover, LEA can reveal the real identity
with the help of TRC in some specific scenarios (typically
for misbehaviors). RSUs update the pseudonym revocation
list (PRL) from LEAs for filtering the requests from invalid
pseudonyms. Relevant notations are listed in Table I.
A. Initialization
In the beginning, for the given security parameter κ,
TRC chooses the master secret key s ∈R Z∗q randomly
and outputs {G1,G2,GT , P,Q, PK1, PK2, q, eˆ, H1, H2, H}
as illustrated in Section III-B. Then LEA chooses its
private key strac ∈R Z∗q randomly, and calculates
the corresponding public key PKtrac = strac · Q.
Finally, TRC sets the public parameters as PP =
{G1,G2,GT , P,Q, PK1, PK2, PKtrac, q, eˆ, H1, H2, H}. We
emphasize that the pairing used in the proposed scheme is
asymmetric, i.e., G1 6= G2 (this kind of pairing is sometimes
called type 3, e.g., see [20]).
B. Key generation
After the initialization, vehicles, and RSUs obtain key pairs
from TRC and pre-load PP . For a vehicle with its real identity
VIDi, TRC runs KeyGen(VIDi) and sends (PIDi,PSKi,PP)
to this vehicle. These parameters (PIDi,PSKi,PP) are pre-
loaded into the tamper-proof device in OBUs. For an RSU
j with its real identity IDj , similarly, it obtains the key pair
(RIDj ,RSKj) from TRC, i.e. RSKj = s ·RIDj . The complete
procedure is shown in Table II.
TABLE I
NOTATION DECLARATIONS
Notations Explanation
s The master secret key
strac The private key of LEA
PKtrac The public key of LEA
PP Public parameters
VIDi Real ID number of vehicle i
PIDi Public key (pseudonym) of vehicle i
PSKi Private key of vehicle i
RIDj Public key of RSU j
RSKj Private key of RSU j
Ki−j A shared secret key between vehicle i and RSU j
L The ring list generated by RSUs
td The expired date of L
Ls The ring list used in ring signature
t The timestamp for signature
tag The traceable tag for signature
KeyGen(·) The key generation algorithm in Section III-C
Signsk(·) The ring signature algorithm in Section III-C
VerifyLs (·) The verification algorithm in Section III-C
Encpk(·) The public encryption algorithm in Section III-C
Decsk(·) The public decryption algorithm in Section III-C
ENCk(·) A symmetric encryption algorithm (e.g., AES)
DECk(·) A symmetric decryption algorithm corresponding to ENC
HMACk(·) A symmetric hash-based message authentication code
a||b String concatenation of a and b
len(·) Return the number of items in an object
PRL Pseudonym revocation list
TABLE II
THE PROCEDURE OF KEY GENERATION
Key generation:
If id belongs to OBU, then
1. VID := id
2. PID = H1(VID)
3. PSK = s · PID
4. record {VID : PID} mapping
If id belongs to RSU, then
1. RID = H2(id)
2. RSK = s · RID
C. Ring list distribution
To illustrate this procedure, assume that a vehicle i is
communicating with an RSU j. In this process, RSU j always
broadcasts RIDj in a designated area. When vehicle i receives
RIDj , it will request the ring list L from RSU j by sending
its encrypted public key PIDi.
Here the identity-based encryption algorithm Encpk(·) is
adopted to encrypt PIDi. The findings in [20] show that there
is an efficient way to transform the elements of G1 to a
short representation in such an asymmetric pairing setting.
Therefore, let PID′i be the short representation of PIDi, then
EncRIDj (PIDi) and DecRSKj (C) are described in Table III.
After that, RSU will check whether PIDi is in PRL or not.
If not, RSU will return a ring list L for the valid vehicle;
otherwise, RSU will reject the request. More precisely, the
procedure is presented in Table IV.
Because of the capability bottleneck of RSUs, we propose
that RSUs store the shared keys locally to reduce computation.
TABLE III
THE ALGORITHMS OF Enc AND Dec
Encryption:
1. Choose r ∈R Z∗q randomly
2. Compute g = eˆ(PK1,RIDj)
3. Transform PIDi into PID′i
4. Set ciphertext C := (rP,PID′i ⊕H(gr))
Decryption:
1. For ciphertext C = (U, V )
2. Decrypt C by using RSKj : PID′i = V ⊕H(eˆ(U,RSKj))
3. Restore PIDi from PID′i
TABLE IV
THE PROCEDURE OF RING LIST DISTRIBUTION
Ring list distribution:
1. RSU j broadcasts its public key RIDj .
2. When vehicle i receives RIDj , it sends the encrypted
pseudonym C = EncRIDj (PIDi).
3. After RSU j receives the ciphertext C, it computes RIDi =
DecRSKj (C).
4. RSU checks if PIDi is in the revocation list PRL. If yes,
simply rejects the requirement.
5. If PIDi is not in PRL, then RSU j computes a shared
secret key Kj−i = eˆ(PIDi,RSKj), and uses Encrypt-
then-MAC approach to deliver the ring list L, i.e., compute
C∗ = ENCKj−i (L) and Σ = HMACKj−i (C∗||td).
Finally sends (C∗,Σ, td) to the vehicle.
6. After the vehicle receives the ciphertext, it first computes
the shared secret key Ki−j = eˆ(PSKi,RIDj), then checks
the message authentication code Σ and recovers L =
DECKi−j (C∗).
D. Sign
For a vehicle Vk holding a ring list L with an unexpired td,
it first choose n′−1 pseudonyms from L randomly to establish
a ring list Ls, i.e., Ls = {PID1,PID2, . . . ,PIDk, . . . ,PIDn′}.
Then it could use ring signature as described in Sec-
tion III-C, i.e., σ = SignPSKk(m||tag||t, Ls), where
tag = eˆ(H1(V ID`||t), PKtrac). Finally it broadcasts
(m,σ, Ls, t, tag). The detailed procedure is illustrated in Ta-
ble V.
TABLE V
THE PROCEDURE OF SIGNING
Sign:
If td is not expired, then
1. Choose n′ − 1 PID from L randomly, and set Ls :=
{PID1, , P ID2, . . . , P IDk, . . . , P IDn′}
2. For i from 1 to n′ and i 6= k, compute:
Ui ←R G1, hi = H(m||tag||t||Ls||Ui)
3. r′ ←R Z∗q , Uk = r′PIDk −
∑n′
r=1,r 6=k(Ui + hiPIDi)
4. hk = H(m||tag||t||Ls||Uk), V = (hk + r′)PSKk
5. Return σ := ({Ui}n′i=1, V )
E. Verification
When the vehicle, e.g., V` receives (m,σ, Ls, t, tag), it
first checks t to prevent replay attack. If the check passes,
then it runs VerifyLs(m||tag||t, σ) to check the validity of the
signature.
As mentioned above, consider the limited capacity of OBUs,
we suggest adopting batch verification proposed in [21].
Table. VI presents the procedures of single verification and
batch verification in detail.
TABLE VI
THE PROCEDURES OF VERIFICATION
Single verification:
1. Let σ = ({Ui}n′i=1, V ), Ls = (PID1,PID2, . . . ,PIDn′ )
2. For i from 1 to n′, compute:
hi = H(m||tag||t||Ls||Ui)
3. Return eˆ(
∑n′
i=1(Ui + hiPIDi), PK2)
?
= eˆ(V,Q)
Batch verification:
1. Given η messages and corresponding signatures, i.e., σbatch =
{σ1, σ2, . . . , ση}, Mbatch = {m1,m2, . . . ,mη}, and
Lbatch = {Ls1, Ls2, . . . , Lsη}
2. For i from 1 to η, and ∀j ∈ {1, len(Lsi)} , compute:
hij = H(mi||tagi||ti||Lsi||Uij)
3. Return
eˆ(
∑η
i=1
∑
j=1(Uij + hijPIDij), PK2)
?
= eˆ(
∑η
i=1 Vi, Q)
F. Trace
Once LEA detects misbehaviors in VANETs, it first cal-
culates tag′ = tag1/strac and sends {Ls,t} to TRC. For
Ls = {PID1,PID2, . . . ,PIDn′}, TRC computes H ′i =
eˆ(Hi(VIDi||t), P ), ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n′}, and returns ∪n′i=1{H ′i}.
By comparing tag′ and ∪n′i=1{H ′i}, LEA can determine the
signer’s pseudonym. Furthermore, LEA would find out the
signer’s true identity by sending the pseudonym to TRC.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security of our scheme.
Recalling the assumptions in Section III, each OBU has a
secure module called HSM, so that HSM provides an inde-
pendent environment to perform these required cryptographic
operations. Each HSM consists of 5 sub-modules as shown in
Fig 4. Hereafter, all analysis is based on the assumption of
HSMs.
Checking Module Encryption Module Decryption Module
Signing Module Verifying Module
Hardware Security Module
 (PSK ,P )e^ ℓ =
? (PID ,PK )e^ ℓ 2
H (ID )1 j =
? RIDj
 C = Enc (PID )RIDj ℓ
K =ℓ−j (PSK ,RID )e^ ℓ j
L = DEC (C )Kℓ−j ∗
 tag = (H (V ID ∣∣t),PK )e^ 1 ℓ trac
σ = Sign (m∣∣tag∣∣t,L )PSKℓ s
Verify (m∣∣tag∣∣t,σ)Ls =
? TRUE
Fig. 4. Abstract construction of HSM
A. Correctness
In V2I communication, when vehicle V` enters the region
within the range of RSUj , it will receive the broadcasting
RIDj in this region. Once V` obtains RIDj , it can invoke the
Checking Module to check the validity of RSUj . In the process
of delivering PID`, the correctness and security are guaranteed
by the property of identity-based encryption scheme [17].
According to the property of bilinear pairing, we know that:
K`−j = eˆ(PSK`,RIDj)
= eˆ(PID`,RIDj)
s
= eˆ(PID`,RSKj)
= Kj−`
It is clearly that both RSUj and V` obtain the same shared
key, and can establish an efficient trusted channel for further
communication through symmetric cryptography.
In V2V communication, if the procedure of signing a mes-
sage m is executed correctly, then the corresponding signature
σ must satisfy the verifying equation.
B. Unforgeability
We say that if a signature σ is unforgeable, an adversary
should not be able to generate a signature for a new message,
given a few signatures corresponding to the messages of his
own choice. Since the ring signature scheme [18] we employed
is proven to be unforgeable against chosen message attacks
in the random oracle model, we note that our protocol is
unforgeable.
C. Conditional anonymity
In V2I communication, RSU j only knows the pseudonym
of V` rather than the true identity of V` (i.e.,VID`). As
for V2V communication, the true signer is hidden in a set
of pseudonyms L. For any eavesdroppers in VANETs, they
cannot figure out the true signer from L even though they
knowing the corresponding tag. Only the LEA can identify
the signer in L through the secret tracing key strac.
D. Against reply attack
Since each message contains a timestamp in our scheme,
namely, once the vehicles figure out that the message is
expired, then it will be abandoned before being verified. If
an adversary forges a fresh timestamp to replace the original
one, then this message must not be able to pass the verification.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
scheme in terms of both computation cost and communication
cost. To be specific, we adopt “MNT159” with degree 6 as
the asymmetric group G1 which has a 159-bit base field size.
In contrast to some recent work where symmetric groups like
“SS512” are employed, we argue that “MNT159” has a shorter
presentation for group elements and is more efficient in batch
verification according to [21] while providing an approximate
secure level [22]. Table VII lists the concrete security level
under different elliptic-curve settings.
All experiments are performed on Raspberry Pi 3b+ which
is a cheap microcomputer with a 1.4 GHz ARM CPU and 1
GB RAM running Debian Linux operation system. Besides,
we invoke the cryptographic framework CHARM [23] to
implement the proposed scheme.
TABLE VII
THE SECURITY LEVEL OF DIFFERENT ELLIPTIC CURVES
G1 G2 GT Security level
MNT159 159 bits 477 bits 945 bits 70 bits
SS512 512 bits 512 bits 1024 bits 80 bits
Secp160k1* 160 bits - - 80 bits
* Secp160k1 is a standardized elliptic curve which is widely used
in mainstream applications such as SSL.
A. Computation cost
To illustrate the computation cost of our scheme clearly,
we provide the real-world benchmark in CHARM of different
operations in three types of elliptic curves as shown in
Table VIII.
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Furthermore, to present the performance differences, we
compare the computation cost of verification of our scheme,
and the other two schemes proposed by Zeng et al. [13],
TABLE VIII
THE TIME COST* OF EXECUTING DIFFERENT CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS IN DIFFERENT ELLIPTIC CURVES
Symbol Description MNT159 SS512 Secp160k1
Tbp The execution time of one bilinear pairing operation 117.10 54.50 -
Tep The execution time of one exponentiation operation on GT 10.82 2.06 -
Tem The execution time of one scale multiplication operation on G1 3.49 9.94 3.32
Tmph The execution time of one map-to-point hash operation on G1 0.446 31.91 -
* The execution time is measured in milliseconds, each operation is evaluated in 1000 times and calculate the average
value.
TABLE IX
THE COMPUTATION COST OF SIGNING AND VERIFICATION FOR A SINGLE MESSAGE*
Message signing (ms) Message verification (ms)
Jiang et al.’s scheme [14] 5Tem ≈ 16.6 6Tem ≈ 19.92
Zeng et al.’s scheme [13] 3Tbp + 4Tep + 4Tem + 2Tmph ≈ 275.02 3Tbp + 3Tep + 4Tem ≈ 209.14
Our scheme 3Tem + Tbp ≈ 127.57 2(Tbp + Tem) ≈ 255.84
* The ring size is 2.
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THE TIME COST* OF EXECUTING DIFFERENT CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS IN DIFFERENT ELLIPTIC CURVES
Symbol Description MNT159 SS512 Secp160k1
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Tem The execution time of one scale multiplication operation on G1 3.49 9.94 3.32
Tmph The execution time of one map-to-point h sh operation on G1 0.446 31.91 -
* The execution time is measured in milliseconds, each operation is evaluated in 1000 times and calculate the average
value.
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Zeng et al.’s scheme [13] 3Tbp + 4Tep + 4Tem + 2Tmph ≈ 275.02 3Tbp + 3Tep + 4Tem ≈ 209.14
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Fig. 7. The computation cost of verification with respect to the number of messages (ring size = 2)
and the other two schemes proposed by Zeng et al. [13],
Jiang et al. [14] respectively. Zeng et al.’s scheme is based
on symmetric bilinear pairing, while Jiang et al.’s scheme is
based on a normal elliptic curve. So that the measurements
for these two schemes are taken on SS512 and Secp160k1
respectively.
Though it seems that our scheme should an employ ellip-
tic curve like Secp160k1 rather than MNT159 according to
Table VIII, the bilinear pairings have advantages in building
identity-based cryptosystem which can reduce the communi-
cation overhead in high-density networks.
It is widely assumed [2], [3], [24] that OBUs have limited
computation capacity. However, Fig. 5 shows the computation
cost of the ring signature depends on the number of ring mem-
bers. Since a 2-member ring is applied in some lightweight
applications such as email signing [25] and VANETs [15], we
argue that privacy can be assured with using the 2-member
ring in our scheme. Based on the benchmark, when ring size
is 2, the computation cost for each phase and entity is shown
in Fig. 6.
According to the implementation results, we find that dis-
tributing a ring list is time-consuming. However, in the phase
of ring-list distribution, the shared key could be cached in
OBU which will avoid double-counting in the next time.
The results in Table VI-A imply that the schemes based
on bilinear pairings have no advantages on the computation
of signing and verification procedure. However, in most sce-
narios, vehicles receive a batch of messages simultaneously
rather than a single message. The results in Fig. 7 shows that
enabling batch verification will greatly decrease the computa-
tion overhead.
B. Communication cost
Because the approaches in Jiang et al.’s scheme [14] is based
on the ElGamal cryptosystem where the generated signature
Fig. 7. The computation cost of verification with respect to the number of messages (ring size = 2)
Jiang et al. [14] respectively. Zeng et al.’s scheme is based
on symmetric bilinear pairing, while Jiang et al.’s scheme is
based on a normal elliptic curve. So that the measurements
for these two schemes are taken on SS512 and Secp160k1
respectively.
Though it seems that our scheme should an employ ellip-
tic curve like Secp160k1 rather than MNT159 according to
Table VIII, the bilinear pairings have advantages in building
ident y-based crypt system whic can reduce the communi-
cation overhead in high-d nsity networks.
It is widely assumed [2], [3], [24] that OBUs have limited
computation capacity. However, Fig. 5 shows the co putation
cost of the ring signature depends on the number of ring mem-
bers. Since a 2-member ring is applied in some lightweight
applications such as email signing [25] and VANETs [15], we
argue that privacy can be assured with using the 2-member
ring in our scheme. Based on the benchmark, when ring size
is 2, the computation cost for each phase and entity is shown
in Fig. 6.
According to the implementation results, we find that dis-
tributing a ring list is time-consuming. However, in the phase
of ring-list distribution, the shared key could be cached in
OBU which will avoid double-counting in the next time.
The results in Table VI-A imply that the schemes based
on bilinear pairings have no advantages on the computation
of signing and verification procedure. However, in most sce-
narios, vehicles receive a batch of messages simultaneously
rather than a single message. The results in Fig. 7 shows that
enabling batch verification will greatly decr ase the computa-
tion overhe d.
B. Communication cost
Because the approaches in Jiang et al.’s scheme [14] is based
on the ElGamal cryptosystem where the generated signature
consists of group elements in pairs. On the other hand, the
generated signature based on bilinear pairing could consist of
one group element (e.g., short signature).
Zeng et al.’s scheme is based on symmetric bilinear pairing
where the size of elements in GT is much larger than that
TABLE X
COMMUNICATION COST (BYTES)*
A single pseudonym A single signature
Jiang et al.’s scheme [14] 38 308
Zeng et al.’s scheme [13] 90 936
Our scheme 30 90
* The communication cost is evaluated by the built-in function serialize()
with enabling compression in CHARM.
in GT under the approximate security setting. The results in
Table X also show that our scheme is more efficient in terms
of communication costs than the other ring signature-based
schemes.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose an efficient identity-based batch
verification scheme for VANETs based on the ring signature.
Unlike other ring signature-based schemes, we restrict the
generation of a ring to avoid disruptions from malicious
vehicles. Consider that VANETs are highly dense in most
real-world scenarios, we adopt batch verification and bilinear
pairing to reduce the computation and communication cost
respectively. To simulate the environment of OBUs, we imple-
ment the proposed scheme on the Raspberry Pi 3b+ platform.
By comparing with other related schemes, our scheme is much
more efficient in computation and communication with batch
mode.
Due to limited space, the approach for finding invalid
signatures in batch verification is not shown in this paper.
As a possible direction of future work, we will give a
more comprehensive illustration of applying batch verification
in VANETs. Moreover, it might be interesting to consider
building HSMs in real-world applications based on the trusted
execution environment (TEE) such as ARM’s TrustZone.
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